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ABSTRACT 
When it comes to the ability of municipalities to face the numerous challenges of an 
increasingly changing world, their size appears to be a key parameter. In effect, increasing the 
size of small municipalities may improve their efficiency. Amalgamating two or more 
municipalities appears to be an attractive solution for reaching such an increase in size. In the 
Swiss institutional context and Swiss direct democracy, however, the success of an 
amalgamation project led by local authorities is not straightforward since most of cantons 
guarantee the institutional existence of their municipalities and require that such projects be 
decided at the polls by the local population. In this respect, a critical condition for the 
success of an amalgamation project at the polls consists in the agreement between the 
population’s expectations and the project goals of the local government. Using data collected 
during a project in which we were involved, we show that a discrepancy between 
population’s expectations and the government’s goals regarding an amalgamation project 
may arise. Such a situation increases the risk of failure at the polls, which would result in a 
significant waste of time and resources for the community. However, we conclude by 
suggesting that by choosing a correct leadership strategy, local authorities may be able to 
reduce the gap and thus make the risk of failure decrease.  
RÉSUMÉ 
La taille des communes est un paramètre clé qui détermine la capacité d’une commune à faire 
face aux nombreux défis posés par un monde en constante mutation. En effet, 
l’accroissement de la taille de petites communes peut permettre d’améliorer leur efficacité. La 
fusion de deux ou plusieurs entités en une nouvelle entité plus grande constitue une solution 
intéressante dans l’optique d’accroître la taille des communes. Toutefois, dans le contexte 
institutionnel suisse, caractérisé notamment par un système de démocratie directe, le succès 
d’un projet de fusion piloté par l’exécutif communal n’est pas acquis a priori dans la mesure 
où de nombreux cantons garantissent l’existence institutionnelle de leur commune à travers la 
constitution cantonale mais également parce que dans la majorité des cas un tel projet doit 
être accepté en votation par la population communale. Ainsi, le succès d’un projet de fusion 
requiert impérativement l’adéquation des objectifs poursuivis par l’exécutif communal à 
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travers son projet avec les attentes de la population vis-à-vis d’une fusion. A l’aide de données 
collectées lors d’un projet de fusion dans lequel nous avons été impliqués, nous démontrons 
qu’un décalage entre les attentes de la population et les objectifs visés par l’exécutif dans le 
cadre du projet de fusion peut survenir. Une telle situation est susceptible d’accroître le risque 
de rejet du projet en votation et d’entrainer par conséquent d’importants gaspillages de temps 
et de ressources pour la collectivité. En conclusion, nous suggérons toutefois que l’exécutif 
peut diminuer un tel risque en réduisant le décalage d’objectifs par rapport à la population en 
adoptant une stratégie de leadership adéquate. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In recent times, local governments have identified certain trends that have influence upon 
their activities: an increasing number of interwoven relations; a need to improve 
performance; and the growing consequences of globalization. With respect to these current 
challenges facing European local governments, the size of administrative areas in terms of 
number of citizens appears to be a critical parameter. A larger size, for example, creates 
economies of scale in the provision of public services, minimizes spillover effects, and 
professionalizes local authorities and office employees.  
For historical and geographical reasons, the Swiss local state level is characterized by the small 
size of its municipalities compared to those in Europe. Among other European countries, 
only France, Slovakia, Iceland and the Czech Republic have as many small municipalities 
(Steiner, 2002, p.176). In a context of constant change, this situation makes it difficult for 
local governments to perform their tasks.  
One way to address this problem is to increase the size of municipalities by amalgamating 
two or more of them. In the field of municipal amalgamation, two distinct approaches have 
emerged in Europe. On the one hand, the Germanic and Anglo-Saxon countries, such as the 
Scandinavian countries, England or Germany, chose a coercive solution by forcing 
municipalities to merge with each other. On the other hand, the countries with a Latin 
tradition, like Italy or Spain, viewed amalgamation as an option for their municipalities, 
encouraging them to choose amalgamation but never forcing it upon them (Dafflon, 2003, 
pp.4-5). In the last decade, amalgamation has been the solution that many Swiss cantons 
(i.e., the regional Swiss level) have chosen to handle the problem of their constitutive 
municipalities being too small. Since Switzerland is at the crossroads of the Germanic and 
Latin cultures of Europe, cantons have selected diverse amalgamation policies. While some 
implemented a coercive policy by forcing the municipalities to merge, like in the canton of 
Glarus, others like Bern, Fribourg or Neuchâtel chose instead a policy based on financial 
incentives to induce their municipalities to voluntarily merge (Robert-Progin and Gigandet, 
2006). A consequence of the latter kind of policy combined with the constitutionally 
guaranteed existence of municipalities is that the leadership role in an amalgamation project 
rests with the local government. Furthermore, because Swiss direct democracy requires that 
such a project be approved by the population at the polls, success is not guaranteed for the 
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local authorities. More specifically, a serious risk of failure at the polls may arise if the project 
does not meet citizens’ preferences. Hence, the purpose of our paper is to analyse whether 
there is a gap between citizens’ expectations and the government’s motivation pertaining to 
an amalgamation project. Depending on the results we will then draw conclusions in terms 
of leadership for local governments.  
In the first part of this paper, the problem of amalgamations and citizens’ preferences will be 
analysed using the agency (or principal-agent) theory framework and a testable hypothesis 
will be formulated. The second part will present the methods used based on data issued from 
an amalgamation project of two Swiss municipalities in the canton of Neuchâtel. The data 
and methods will allow us to test our assumption. Finally, we present the results obtained by 
mean of three tables and present some consequences for local governments in terms of the 
leadership strategy to choose. 
2. THE AMALGAMATION OF MUNICIPALITIES AS A 
PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEM 
Since most cantonal legislation guarantees the institutional existence of every municipality, 
most cantonal governments are unable to force their constitutive municipalities to merge 
with each other. In those cantons, the leadership role in amalgamation projects consequently 
rests with the local governments. Furthermore, Swiss direct democracy requires that a 
municipal amalgamation be decided at the polls by the concerned population. One might 
think that this institutional constraint is sufficient to guarantee that the submitted 
amalgamation project meets the will of the population. since it is tied to politicians’ goals of 
re-election. In such cases, the probability of a project failing at the polls remains very low.  
However the coherence between the will of the population and the motivation of the 
government is far from sure. Some failures of amalgamation projects in Switzerland can be 
explained by this lack of coherence. At the theoretical level, this idea is sustained by the 
principal-agent model. This theory asserts that an asymmetry of information may arise 
between the parties to a contract therby creating inefficiencies. Let us take the example of 
when one party to the contract (the principal) mandates another party (the agent) and 
delegates the accomplishment of a precise task to it. An asymmetry of information arises if 
the agent has own preferences or goals that cannot be observed or known by the principal. In 
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this case, the risk exists that the way in which the agent achieves the task does not correspond 
to the way prefered by the principal and will correspond instead to the agent's preferences or 
goals (Mas-Colell et alii, 1995, pp. 447-489).  
Transposing this theory to the functioning of a municipality, the population (the principal) 
delegates the fulfilment of several tasks to the local government (the agent). During an 
amalgamation project, a discrepancy may arise between the goals carried out by the 
politicians and the expectations the citizens have about the project thereby increasing the risk 
of a failure at the polls and postponing the realization of the project for many years. In this 
respect, an interesting question to ask is whether the preferences of the local government do 
indeed reflect those of the population or not. Consequently, we set the hypothesis to be 
tested in this paper as the following: "The goals addressed by the municipal government in an 
amalgamation project do not reflect those of the municipal population". Whether this hypothesis 
is confirmed or not has strong implications for the local government in term of leadership. 
Should the hypothesis be rejected, the risk of failure at the polls would remain low. 
Consequently, the local government could simply work out a project according to its own 
preferences and submit it to the population which should accept it. 
Should the assumption be confirmed, the risk of the project being rejected by the population 
would be quite high. In such a situation, and insofar as the government knows about the 
existence of a gap, the local authority may choose between two leadership strategies. On the 
one hand, the government may choose a so-called "weak" leadership. This requires the local 
government to adapt its project in order to produce one that better meets citizens' 
preferences at the expense of the government's own preferences, thus automatically increasing 
the probability of a success at the polls. On the other hand, the local government may choose 
a so-called "strong" leadership strategy. This means the government still produces an 
amalgamation project according to its own preferences, thus maintaining a high risk of 
failure at the polls. To decrease this risk, the government must commit itself to conducting a 
significant information campaign. The strong leadership strategy means that the government 
must sell its project to the citizens and persuade them that it is the best project for the future 
of the municipality. 
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To test the previously stated assumption and to infer conclusions in terms of local 
governments’ leadership, we now turn to the presentation of some data collected during an 
amalgamation project of two Swiss municipalities. 
3. DATA FROM THE AMALGAMATION OF TWO SWISS 
MUNICIPALITIES 
Many cantons have enacted special laws to induce municipalities to amalgamate, hence many 
amalgamation projects have already been conducted in Switzerland. The canton of Neuchâtel 
implemented such a law and consequently faces the emergence of several projects among 
which we can study the one pertaining to the municipalities of Corcelles-Cormondrèche and 
Peseux1. This project is particularly suitable for testing our hypothesis since we were involved 
in every step of the project. This allowed us to collect not only data about the goals of the 
members of the local government but also data about the population's fears and expectations 
towards the amalgamation project.  
In the first step of the project, data pertaining to the population were obtained by means of a 
survey of the populations of both municipalities2. The purpose of such a survey was to gauge 
the opinion of the respective populations in order to ascertain whether it was worth going 
ahead with the project. Two questions were asked about the main expectations and fears of 
the population towards the prospect of a closer collaboration or even an amalgamation. Each 
citizen was asked to mention her or his three main expectations and three main fears 
regarding the following items3 :  
- prospects for development (improvement/deterioration) 
- services supplied by the municipality (improvement/deterioration) 
- production costs of services and taxes (increase/decrease) 
- power of the municipality towards the canton or other municipalities (gain/loss) 
- control of the authorities and administration by the citizens (gain/loss) 
- identification of the citizen with her or his municipality (gain/loss) 
- interest in municipal politics (increase/decrease) 
                                                 
1 Between 2000 et 2006,we were involved in the following project of amalgamation : La Tour-de-Trême and Bulle (canton of 
Fribourg ) ; Corcelles-Cormondrèche and Peseux (canton of Neuchâtel, NE) ; Le Locle and La-Chaux-de-Fonds (NE) ; Thielle-
Wavre and Marin-Epagnier (NE) ; Bevaix, Boudry and Cortaillod (NE) ; La Heute, Orvin, Péry, Plagne, Romont and Vauffelin 
(canton of Bern ), and finally Dardagny, Russin, Satigny (canton of Geneva ). 
2 See Beutler & Soguel (2006) for the detailed results of the survey. 
3 The items are coherent with those mentioned by Keating (1995). 
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For each of those items, four different situations may arise: the citizen has neither expectation 
nor fear, the citizen has only an expectation, the citizen has only a fear, or finally the citizen 
has an expectation as well as a fear simutaneously4. The proportion of citizens identifying an 
item as a source of expectation and/or fear provides information about the weight or 
relevance of this item for the population: the higher the percentage, the more relevant the 
item. Thus, the proportion of responses to each item provides us with a mesure of the 
population's goals or preferences. 
The data pertaining to the authorities were collected during the second step of the project. 
The purpose of this second step was to evaluate whether an amalgamation is really the 
suitable solution for the municipalities or whether another solution would be preferable. To 
perform this evaluation we developed a method based on five different analysis axes. These 
axes seek to cover every dimension at stake in an amalgamation project5. We first use a so-
called "Development and Leadership" axis, which evaluates whether an amalgamation is able 
to improve the development prospects of the municipalities and to increase the leadership 
power towards others jurisdictions. The second axis pertains to the dimension of "Public 
Opinion and Local Identity" of an amalgamation, which mesures the compatibility of the 
amalgamating municipalities in their political orientations and their feelings of self-identity. 
The third axis, "Finance", mesures the financial compatibility of the amalgamating 
municipalities. The two last axes analyse whether an amalgamation could increase the 
efficiency of the provision of services by the municipalities. The fourth axis, "Decision about 
the Services", evaluates the room for improvement in the quality of the decision-making 
process relating to the services supplied. This evaluation should determine whether an 
amalgamation would improve the satisfaction of the citizens' needs. The last axis, 
"Production of the Services", analyses whether amalgamation can create economies of scale 
and hence offer different services more efficiently. 
In order to perform the analysis as correctly as possible, the members of the local government 
were asked to weight the different axes according to their own priorities. The results of this 
weighting process provide us with a mesure of the goals on which the authorities are focusing 
                                                 
4 For example the same citizen may expect or hope the amalgamation will make the tax rate decrease but may simultaneously 
fear the amalgamation will in fact make the taxe rate increase. 
5 See Soguel & Léchot (2006) for a detailed presentation of this method 
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through the amalgamation project6. We can then sum the weights to obtain a single mesure 
for the local government as a whole. 
Finally, the test of our assumption consists of comparing the data for the population with 
those obtained for the local governement. If we observe some significant discrepancies, then 
the hypothesis will be verified. Conversely, if it appears that the population and authority 
place weight on the same goals, the hypothesis will be rejected. The next section presents the 
results obtained. 
4. THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT GAP AND THE LEADERSHIP ROLE 
OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
The results will be presented in three steps. We first give a presentation of the relative 
proportions obtained with respect to the expectations and fears of the citizens (table 1). 
Secondly, we present the data obtained from the local government through the weighting of 
the axes (table 2). Finally, we reformulate the data for the population according to the 
previously described axis method in order to make them comparable with those of the 
government (table 3). This final data comparison will allow us to properly test our 
assumption. We will then discuss the consequences of the results for the leadership role of 
local government. 
Table 1 presents the proportion of the population that mentioned each item as an 
expectation, a fear, or an expectation and a fear simultaneously. The elements in the table 
represent an estimation of the relevance of each item for the population of both 
municipalities. The first interesting result is that both populations have very similar opinions. 
The most important discrepancy is Identification, with a difference of seven percentage 
points. For both populations the most relevant item is by far the item pertaining to the costs 
of services and taxes. Note that the last column mentions the analysis axis to which each item 
belongs. Three items are related to the Development and Leadership axis. In order to make 
the data comparable with those of the government we will then sum up those three features 
and calculate the mean.  
                                                 
6 The estimated weights by each member of the government were quantified by mean of the MACBETH (Measuring 
Attractivness by a Categorical-based Evaluation Technique) algorithm (Bana e Costa & Vanswick, 1999) 
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Table 1 – Data from the population's survey 
Items relative to   Shares in %     Analysis axis 
expectations and/or fears 
Corcelles-
C. Peseux   corresponding to the items 
Costs of services and taxes 94 94  Finance (FIN) 
Services supplied by the municipality 73 72   Production of the Services (PROD-S) 
Perspectives of development 65 66   Development and Leadership (D&L) 
Power towards canton and oth. 
i i liti
54 48   Development and Leadership (D&L) 
Identification with the municipality 54 47   Public Opinion and Local Identity 
(PO&LI)
Interest for municipal politics 41 38   Development and Leadership (D&L) 
Control on authorities and administration 41 39   Decision about the services (DEC-S) 
Total 422 404   
Source : Beutler & Soguel (2006)     
 
The data regarding the members of the local governments were collected during a special 
weighting session. Members were asked to weight the different analysis axes according to 
their own priorities and preferences. Table 2 shows the relative relevance of each axis for the 
government7. The results indicate that for the government an amalgamation project must 
clearly give priority to the development and leadership dimension as well as to the decision-
making dimension relating to services. 
 
Table 2 - Weighting of the axis by the government 
Analysis axis Weights, in % 
Development and Leadership (D&L) 25 
Decision about the services (DEC-S) 25 
Finance (FIN) 18 
Production of the Services (PROD-S) 18 
Public Opinion and Local Identity (PO&LI) 14 
Total 100 
Source : Soguel & Léchot (2006)
 
The sum of the weight for the government is exactly 100, which is not the case for the 
population. To make the data comparable, we normalised the sum of the populations' 
proportions to 100 and calculate the relative weights. We can then compare the weights of 
the populations and the local government. 
 
                                                 
7 Note that although we handle with two municipalities, table 2 presents a single indicator. This is due to the fact that the axes 
were weighted simultaneously by both local governments. The composite indicator was obtained through a negociation between 
the members of both governments. 
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Table 3 - Comparison between the populations’ and the government's data 
Analysis axis Weights, in % 
  Population Government 
  Peseux Corcelles-C.   
Finance (FIN) 31 30 18 
Production of the services (PROD-S) 24 23 18 
Development and Leadership (D&L) 17 17 25 
Public Opinion and Local Identity (PO&LI) 16 17 14 
Decision about the services (DEC-S) 13 13 25 
Total 100 100 100 
Sources : Soguel et Léchot (2006), Beutler et Soguel (2006)   
 
Table 3 shows the priority axes for both populations as well as for the government. The axes 
are ordered according to the populations' priorities. The aspects related to finance and to the 
production of services appear to be the most important concern for the population. On the 
contrary, those aspects seem less relevant to the government. Indeed, it puts more weight on 
the previously mentioned leadership and development as well as decision making aspects, 
which clearly are not priorities for both populations. Consequently, the results of table 3 lead 
us to conclude that our previously set hypothesis is verified, at least partly. That means, 
according to the agency theory, that we observe a gap between the populations' and the 
government's preferences pertaining to an amalgamation project8. Hence the targeted goals 
of the amalgamation project worked out by the government could diverge from those of the 
population. One should be careful when interpreting these results in as far as they are more 
evenly distributed for the government (18% to 25%) than for the populations (13% to 
31%). 
Regardless, this case study still represents a good exemple of the emergence of a discrepancy 
between authorities and population regarding the implementation of a public policy, in this 
case an amalgamation project. Furthermore, in a direct democracy framework where the final 
decision often rests with the population, the existence of such a gap drastically increases the 
risk of failure at the polls. If the government knows about the existence of such a gap, it must 
make a decision about the leadership strategy to undertake to reduce the gap and decrease the 
risk of failure. 
                                                 
8 Note that some empirical studies suggest that such a gap can also be observed between the government and the population on 
one side and the administration on the other. In a 1998 survey, Steiner asked 2914 secretaries of Swiss municipalities about the 
advantages of an amalgamation. They mentioned as a first advantage the possibilities of professionalization. The less often 
mentioned advantage was the reduction of the tax burden (Steiner, 2002, p.348). Hence the preoccupations of the 
administration pertaining to amalgamations seem to be different than those of the population and government. 
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On one side, the government can commit to a "weak" leadership strategy, meaning the 
government renounces its own priorities or preferences and works out a project that meets 
those of the citizens. This reduction in gap would automatically make the risk of a failure 
decrease while simultaneously reducing the political cost a failure would imply for the 
members of the government. The other advantage of such a strategy is that the higher 
legitimacy of the project will make it easier to implement. Note that the weak leadership 
strategy implies that citizen's preferences are precisely known, which requires the investment 
of ressources to collect this information. This cost has to be taken into account in the strategy 
choice. 
On the other side, the government can commit to a "strong" leadership strategy. That means 
the government maintains its priorities and works out an amalgamation project that meets its 
own preferences. Consequently, to reduce the risk of a failure at the polls, the government 
must decrease the gap by altering citizens' preferences to reflect its own. To reach this goal, 
the authorities must develop a complete information campaign in which the government 
must present the advantages of the project to the citizens and persuade them it is the best 
project for the future of the municipality. This can induce change in citizens' preferences 
hence reducing the gap and persuading the citizens to vote for the government's project. The 
strong leadership strategy requires more time to be spent on the project and better 
communication skills from the authorities. These facts should also be taken into account in 
the strategy choice. 
5. CONCLUSION 
In this paper we sought to test whether or not the preoccupation of the authorities regarding 
an amalgamation project mirrors the population’s preferences. According to the agency 
theory, a discrepancy may arise between the government and the population due to an 
asymmetry of information. In the Swiss direct democracy institutional framework, such a 
discrepancy may lead to a failure at the polls. 
Using data obtained from an amalgamation project of two Swiss municipalities, we showed 
the relevance of the principal agent theory in the field of municipal amalgamation. Indeed, 
the data clearly verified the existance of the predicted gap and, in the Swiss context, of the 
risk of failure at the polls. To close this gap, we suggested two possible leadership strategies 
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for the government. It can choose a weak leadership strategy, which requires the government 
to change its project according to the preferences of the population. Alternatively, the 
governement may choose a strong leadership strategy, which consists in persuading the 
citizens to change their preferences by convincing them of the advantages of the 
government’s project . 
Naturally, generalities cannot be formed based on the previous conclusions without taking 
several points into account. Firstly, one should note that data for the government and the 
population were obtained using two different methods. Hence we cannot guarantee that the 
same result would have been observed if the same method had been applied to both 
government and population. Secondly, our test relates only to one case of amalgamation and 
for one particular public policy, i.e. amalgamation. Consequently, this result doesn’t 
automatically hold for other municipalities or other public policy in Switzerland. Thirdly, 
the risk that the project may fail at the polls is a typical Swiss constraint that is not necessarily 
relevant to other European municipalities. 
This paper does suggest, however, that the agency theory analysis is relevant in the context of 
local public policy and that the possibility of observing a gap between authorities’ and 
citizens’ prefences shouldn’t be neglected by the former. Even in European countries that do 
not have a direct democracy system, disregarding the will of the population may lead to a 
reprimand of the citizens in the shape of a non re-election. Furthermore, taking citizens’ 
preoccupations into account may help authorities achieve one of their main task, i.e. 
satisfying citizens’ needs. 
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